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  Now, at the end of the 20th century, many OECD countries face serious 
problems in achieving both prosperity and social cohesion. One important - and sadly 
neglected - source of these problems are the very policy systems that are meant to 
address them. I will argue that these policy systems - including taxes and transfers, 
regulations governing employment, welfare services, and many more - are imparting a 
serious long-term imbalance to their host countries, by making these countries 
increasingly vulnerable to economic, social and political shocks. Although these 
policy systems were originally designed with the express aim to cushion citizens from 
these shocks and to provide security against a variety of uncertainties, their long-term 
effect is turning out to be the opposite of what was intended.  
  This paper examines how and why this has happened and then turns to some 
important, recent economic developments that are likely to make this problem more 
serious in the future. Finally, it examines a strategy for economic policy reform that 
addresses the problem and thereby provides a means for achieving more favorable 
economic and social outcomes in the years ahead. 
1. Policy Systems as a Source of Imbalance in the OECD 
  The central pillars of the main OECD policy systems - unemployment benefit 
systems, job security regulations, networks of taxes and transfers, pension systems, 
health and education systems, and various other groups of welfare state entitlements - 
were erected in the golden years of the 1950s and 60s, when economic growth was 
high, the labor force was increasing, unemployment was low, and poverty was falling. 
In the light of this propitious economic performance, only a small minority of citizens 
required the support that the welfare states were offering, and even when they did so, 
the need was often only temporary. Under these circumstances, it was possible for 
governments to be generous in providing support for the poor, benefits for the 
unemployed, pensions for the elderly, education for the young, and health care for the 
sick.  
  With the upsurge in economic activity, a large group of tax-paying, employed 
people helped support a relatively small group of unemployed ones; a large group of 
healthy people provided for a small group of unhealthy and disabled ones. As 
populations and labor forces grew, a relatively large group of young people financed A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM      2 
the pensions of a relatively small group of retirees. In short, the prevailing economic 
policy systems were able to provide substantial economic security and protection 
against poverty as long as little reliance was placed on these systems. 
  But the services of these systems have been important to most people’s well-
being even when they were not used. An important reason is that people often get 
stuck in unfavorable economic and social states unless they receive prompt help in 
overcoming them. those who become ill may remain unhealthy unless they receive 
prompt treatment; people who fall into poverty may remain there unless they receive 
some support to improve their skills and gain appropriate employment; people who 
become unemployed require prompt incentives to find work again, before they 
become deskilled, unmotivated, and stigmatized. In these various ways, welfare state 
policy systems made important contributions to prosperity and social cohesion, even 
though only a relatively small minority of the population made use of them at any 
given point in time. 
  In a sense, the service of these policy systems played a role similar to fire 
insurance in making a significant contribution to one’s peace of mind even when 
one’s house hasn’t burnt down. The ability of these policy systems to cushion people 
from economic uncertainties and to correct glaring market failures in the provision of 
education, health insurance, unemployment insurance, and pensions doubtlessly 
played an important role in promoting the postwar prosperity. Public support for 
education helped raise people’s skills; job security legislation helped bond employers 
to their employees and thereby gave both parties incentives to invest in training; 
unemployment benefits gave the temporarily unemployed people the means to search 
for the appropriate jobs, rather than accepting the first position that came along; public 
health provision helped promote a healthier, and hence more productive, workforce; 
income redistribution systems and poverty programs helped create more cohesive 
societies and reduce social polarization along with the associated costs of crime and 
social tension.  
  In these many ways, the welfare states amplified the favorable economic and 
social conditions most OECD countries faced in the early postwar years. 
  But then, around the mid-1970s, the party came to an end. After the first oil 
price shock in 1973, trend productivity growth in most market economies fell sharply 
and, despite subsequent booms and periods of optimism, has not recovered since then. A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM      3 
As result, poverty became a more challenging problem and income redistribution, to 
meet this problem, became more painful. As the postwar baby boom subsided, 
population growth slowed, particularly in Europe. This meant that the people of 
working age were required to support an increasingly larger proportion of older 
people. In addition, the increasingly generous pensions, which the retirees were unable 
to bequeath to their children, reduced people’s incentive to save, and stimulated 
consumption at the expense of capital accumulation. Furthermore, the long recessions 
of the mid-1970s, early 1980s, and early 1990s - interacting with the European nexus 
of stringent job security provisions and generous unemployment benefits - made 
European unemployment rates drift inexorably upwards, from an average EC rate of 
3.7% in the 1970s, to 9.1% in the 1980s, to around 11% now. Thus unemployment 
benefits and income support, which were originally designed to tide people over 
temporary jobless spells, became their mainstay over many years and, in some cases, 
the basis for an unemployed way of life. In Europe, therefore, the employed tax payers 
were required to support a growing segment of unemployed claimants. 
  On account of these developments, welfare state spending rose rapidly as 
percentage of GNP in Europe and most other OECD areas. This rise in spending, 
combined with the shrinking tax base, made it necessary to governments to raise taxes 
and public borrowing. Increasingly, these governments found it difficult to meet their 
commitments in supporting education, health, disability, housing, unemployment 
insurance, and pensions. The increasing taxes on employers discouraged job creation, 
the increasing taxes on employees discouraged job search, the increasing taxes on 
non-wage incomes and wealth discouraged saving and capital accumulation. Public 
borrowing put upward pressure on real interest rates, thereby discourage capital 
accumulation even more.  
  After about a decade of these developments, it was therefore virtually 
inevitable therefore that governments in many OECD countries should find 
themselves confronted by an overwhelming need for retrenchment in the 1980s. The 
pace and scale of this retrenchment process varied considerably among the OECD 
countries and was dictated profoundly by voting arithmetic. As result, the process 
turned out to be highly asymmetric. Since the poor and the unemployed are generally 
not a large or influential segment of the voting population, it has often been easier for 
governments to relinquish previous commitments to these groups than to the middle A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM      4 
classes. Thus, in many OECD countries, eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits 
and income support were tightened, monitoring procedures for the fulfillment of these 
criteria became more stringent, regulations were relaxed to allow greater scope for 
temporary, part-time, and self-employment, and the growth of various poverty 
programs was arrested or rolled back. On the other hand, public spending on pensions 
and (to a somewhat lesser degree) on education and health has been largely unaffected 
by the drive towards fiscal austerity.  Job security legislation protecting the positions 
of the established, incumbent employees was also left largely intact. 
  As result, governments have become progressively less able to protect their 
citizens from economic uncertainties - just at the time when these uncertainties were 
growing. A wide variety of forces - including the liberalization of product markets, the 
expansion of international trade and capital flows, the skill-bias of recent 
technological advances, and changes in the organization of firms - has led to an 
increasing dispersion of wages or employment opportunities in many OECD 
countries. This dispersion has been amplified through the asymmetric course of policy 
retrenchment since the 1980s. As transfers to the middle classes have remained intact 
while support for the poor and disadvantaged as fallen away, the distribution of 
economic outcomes has inevitably widened further. Thus societies have become 
progressively polarized, between the long-term employed and the long-term 
unemployed, the high-wage and low-wage earners, or those with abundant and 
favorable job opportunities and those with few and unfavorable ones. As firms 
become increasingly vulnerable to market forces, there is a danger that long-term 
commitments between employers and employees may become increasingly unstuck, 
thereby reducing the incentives to invest in training. The social polarization threatens 
the efficiency of market transactions by encouraging crime and necessitating rising 
expenditures on crime prevention. 
2. The “Quicksand Effect” 
  In retrospect, we can see that just many of the common OECD policy systems 
amplified the favorable social and economic developments of the 1950s and 60s, so 
they are also amplifying the unfavorable developments that have occurred since then. I 
would like to call this the “quicksand effect.” It signifies that, in the long run, the A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM      5 
prevailing policy systems have not provided a firm foundation for supporting people 
against poverty and uncertainty and promoting prosperity and social cohesion. Rather, 
the more people need to be supported, the greater are the political and economic 
pressures on governments to reduce that support. The prevailing policy systems, in 
other words, are a bit like quicksand: they start giving way as soon as enough weight 
is placed on them.  
  Conversely, the less the support is required, the greater are the political 
pressures to make it more generous. This is the sense in which the prevailing policy 
systems have created economic and social imbalance over the long run. 
3. A General Strategy of Policy Reform 
  It is important to keep in mind that this imbalance is the product of past policy 
decisions, which may be revised once the source of the imbalance has been 
recognized. To find the appropriate guidelines for policy reform, European 
governments must first understand the need to design policies that are automatic 
stabilizers in two senses at the same time: When there is an increase in the likelihood 
of an adverse economic or social contingency - such as the risk of unemployment, 
illness, poverty, insufficient education and training opportunities, insufficient support 
for old age - the policies must automatically provide  
•  more support for the people affected by that contingency, and  
•  greater economic incentives to overcome the contingency. 
To see how this works in a specific instance, consider the implications for this 
strategy for the reform of unemployment policy. Here the aim is to replace current 
unemployment policy measures by ones that have the following dual stabilizer 
function: when unemployment rises, they must automatically provide (i) more support 
for the unemployed and (ii) greater incentives for employment creation and job search. 
  Current unemployment benefit systems fulfill the first condition but not the 
second. When unemployment rises, the government’s aggregate unemployment 
benefit payments increase, providing more support for the unemployed. But incentives 
for employment creation and job search are reduced: the unemployment benefits 
discourage the unemployed from seeking jobs, for when an unemployed person finds a 
job, the unemployment benefits are withdrawn and taxes are imposed; furthermore, A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM      6 
the unemployment benefits put upward pressure on wages and thereby discourage 
employment. And it is because current unemployment benefit systems do not act as 
unemployment stabilizers in the second sense, that the quicksand effect arises. Since 
these systems augment the underlying unemployment problem, they destabilize the 
government’s budget and thereby create political pressures to make these systems less 
generous. 
  Reform of current economic policy systems should be aimed at breaking this 
trade-off between stability of people’s incomes and stability of the government budget 
deficits. Before examining the requisite reform strategy, we turn some important 
recent developments that may be expected to make the underlying problem worse - 
and thus the need for reform more urgent - with the passage of time. 
4. Challenges to Social Cohesion 
  Let us now consider three important challenges that will make it increasingly 
difficult for policy makers to achieve prosperity growth together with social cohesion 
in the decades ahead. Although these challenges are strongly interrelated, we will 
consider them under the broad headings of (a) globalization and skill-biased 
technological change, and (ii) changes in the organization of firms. 
4a. Globalization and Skill-Biased Technological Change 
In recent years it has often been claimed that the gradual erosion of barriers to 
international trade and foreign direct investment has expanded both the market 
opportunities and competitive pressures faced by many companies in the OECD, and 
this has created an increasingly global matrix of business strategies. One important 
consequence of this development, so the story goes, is that the advanced market 
economies are achieving an ever more pronounced comparative advantage in the 
production of commodities that are relatively intensive in skilled labor.
1 This is often 
                                                 
1See, for example, Leamer (1994), Sachs and Schatz (1994), and Wood (1994) A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM      7 
touted as the reason why the demand for skilled labor has risen relative to that for 
unskilled labor in Europe as well as the United States.
2  
In the US, where wages are comparatively flexible, the response has allegedly 
been increasing wage dispersion; in many European countries - where wages are 
compressed through legislation, centralized bargaining, norms, union pressures, and 
welfare state entitlements  - the result has been rising unemployment of unskilled 
people. In either case, the resulting trend toward greater inequality in income and 
wealth is seen to pose a major threat to social cohesion in the advanced market 
economies. It is also viewed as endangering the future prosperity of these countries, as 
goods requiring low-skill labor inputs are increasingly imported and factories to 
produce these goods are increasingly shifted to the low-wage economies of the Far 
East and Central Europe. 
This account doubtlessly has some explanatory power, but it does not tell the full 
story since it doesn’t fit all the relevant facts:  
 
•  Trade flows are probably still too small a proportion of national product in Europe 
and the US to account for more than a small percentage of the massive increase in 
European unemployment and the dramatic fanning out of the American wage 
distribution over the 1980s.  
•  A significant amount of trade between the advanced market economies of Europe 
and the US (on the one hand) and the emerging markets of Asia and the East (on 
the other) is intra-industry - not inter-industry - trade, even at the three-digit level; 
and there is little reason of course why intra-industry trade should raise the demand 
for skilled relative to unskilled labor.  
•  According to the conventional wisdom,
3 the expansion of international trade 
induces the unskilled workers to move from the import-competing sectors (where 
wages are comparatively low and/or unemployment is comparatively high) to the 
protected sectors. But there appears to have been little movement of this sort in the 
advanced market economies. Instead of a change in the industry mix - a rise in the 
use of skilled labor in the sectors producing skill-intensive goods and a fall in the 
                                                 
2In accordance with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the fall in demand for unskilled workers will spill over 
from the tradable to the non-tradable sectors. 
3 This view is founded on the Hecksher-Ohlin trade theory of international trade. A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM      8 
use of labor elsewhere - most sectors have increased their ratio of skilled to 
unskilled labor. 
•  It is far from clear that the skill level (weighted by population) of the countries 
trading with Europe and the US has, on average, gone down (on account of, say, 
the increasing role of China in world trade) or up (on account of the rising skill 
levels of, say, the Japanese and Korean workforce). 
 
Beyond that, technological change is often deemed to be another explanation for 
the joint problems of increasing wage dispersion and unemployment in many OECD 
countries. It is argued that the technological change over the past two decades has 
been heavily skill-biased - once again, raising the demand for skilled relative to 
unskilled labor.
4 There is some evidence that firms spending relatively large amounts 
on R&D tend to pay relatively high wages to their skilled employees
5. There is also 
evidence that workers who use computers tend to earn relatively high wages
6. 
There is, however, an important sense in which this is not an explanation at all. 
Economists define technological change as anything that shifts the production 
function. It is the residual change in output, after all other sources - namely, change in 
the use of inputs - have been accounted for. Since it is a residual, we simply don’t 
know where is comes from. Thus to say that the rise in the demand for skilled relative 
to unskilled workers is due to skill-biased technological change virtually like saying 
that we don’t know why this change in relative demand has occurred. 
  In any case, it is clear that globalization and skill-biased technological change 
are bound to make many of the current economic policy systems greater sources of 
imbalance. The reason is that, by widening the distribution of incomes, they widen 
and deepen citizen’s reliance on public support and thereby augment the quicksand 
effect. 
                                                 
4See, for example, Bound and Johnson (1992) and Mincer (1989, 1991). 
5For example, Machin (1996). 
6This is documented in Berman, Bound and Griliches (1993) and Krueger (1993). Krueger claims that 
computer use on the job can account for 1/3 to 1/2 of the rise in the rate of return to education. A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM      9 
4b. The Organizational Revolution 
Another important development, that has been documented extensively in the 
recent business management and sociological literature
 7  but has received hardly any 
attention from the economics profession,
8 is a constellation of phenomena that I shall 
call facets of the “organizational revolution”. It has the following salient features. 
First, in a significant and growing cross-section of companies in the advanced 
market economies, the command-and-control style of management - where authority 
flows from the senior executives down through middle management to the workers in 
the functional departments - is being replaced by a flatter organizational structure, 
with a large number of teams reporting directly to the central management with few, if 
any, intermediaries.  
In the process, the functional specialization of the traditional firms is being 
reversed: each of the small teams performs many of the separate tasks that used to be 
divided among separate departments. The teams are now often organized with 
reference to particular sets of customers rather than tasks. It is the “integration” of 
tasks that permits the teams to give customers more individual attention. This 
development also means that substantial layers of middle management are no longer 
needed. 
Second, there are radical, interrelated changes in the organization of production. 
In both the manufacturing and service sectors, returns to scale in production are 
drastically reduced, with the introduction of flexible machine tools and programmable 
equipment and the use of computer-aided customization of goods and services. Setup 
and retooling costs have come down, and this permits production in smaller batch 
sizes, shorter production cycles, smaller delivery lags, and - with the help of 
computer-aided design - quicker product development.  
These changes have enabled producers to adopt ideas such as “lean production” 
(keeping inventories low) and “just-in-time production” (delivering supplies only 
when they are required). These are not simply cost-cutting devices. They are also a 
                                                 
7For a survey of the evidence on these developments, see Appelbaum and Bott (1994), Hammer and Champy 
(1993), Lundgren (1994), Pfeffer (1994), and Wickstrom and Norman (1994). 
8First attempt to subject these phenomena to economic analysis is made in Lindbeck and Snower (1995a,b), 
and Snower (1996d). Milgrom and Roberts (1990) examine a subset of these phenomena relevant to 
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method of decentralizing the production and associated learning process, since they 
expose bottlenecks where they arise and give the front-line workers the opportunity to 
overcome them on their own. The new innovations also permit an increasing degree of 
integration between design, engineering, and manufacturing.  
Third, there have been dramatic changes in the nature of products and in seller-
customer relations. The new “holistic” companies offer broader product lines in 
smaller quantities. There is also greater emphasis on product quality and sensitivity to 
purchasers’ requirements: products are developed and improved over progressively 
shorter periods of time, methods of quality control are becoming steadily more 
stringent, and more product adjustments are made in response to customer demand. 
There is also increasing scope for customer participation in the design of new 
products. These include not only information and repairs, but also prompt processing 
of orders and individualized marketing.  
Fourth, in the new types of business organizations, occupational barriers are 
beginning to break down, as employees are given multiple responsibilities, often 
spanning production, development, finance, accounting, administration, training, and 
customer relations. 
The new, smaller, customer-oriented teams require versatility, cognitive and 
social competence, as well as judgment. What matters is not only the competence in a 
particular activity of production, organization, development, and marketing, but rather 
all-round knowledge, potential to acquire multiple skills, and ability to learn how the 
experience gained from one skill enhances another skill. In this context, traditional 
occupational distinctions begin to lose their significance and what we mean by 
“skilled” versus “unskilled” workers becomes radically changed.  
The implications of these developments is far-reaching. To begin with, they help 
explain the rising resistance to centralized wage bargaining relative to firm-level 
bargaining in many OECD countries. A usual objective of centralized bargaining is 
“equal pay for equal work”, and this it invariably imposes some uniformity of wages 
across workers for given tasks. But when employees are given multiple 
responsibilities, spanning various complementary tasks, this practice can become very 
inefficient, for there is no reason to believe that the productivity of one employee’s 
time at a particular task should be similar to the productivity of another employee’s 
time at that task. For instance, there is no reason that time spent with customers A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM      11 
should affect the productivity of a product designer in the same way as it affects the 
productivity of a production worker. Thus the restructured firms often have an 
incentive to offer different workers different wages for the same task. But this is 
precisely the practice that centralized wage bargaining inhibits. In this way, the 
restructuring process raises the efficiency costs of centralized bargaining and thus 
gives employers and employees growing incentives to choose decentralized bargaining 
arrangements instead. This, however, may be expected to increase wage dispersion in 
countries where centralized  bargaining has compressed the distribution of wages.  
Furthermore, insofar as women tend to specialize less in terms of skills than 
men, these developments help explain some of the narrowing male-female wage 
differentials and nonemployment differentials. And finally, insofar as people within 
given occupational, educational, and job tenure groups differ substantially in terms of 
their versatility as well as the social and cognitive skills necessary for success in 
holistic organizations, these development also offer a new explanation for the 
widening wage dispersion within  these occupational, educational, and job tenure 
groups. 
  The organizational revolution magnifies the influence of globalization and 
skill-biased technological change on the performance of the currently dominant 
OECD policy systems. Specifically, the organizational revolution makes it more likely 
that these systems will become a source of economic and social imbalance in the long 
run. The reason is that, by increasing the dispersion of incomes between versatile and 
non-versatile workers and between well educated and poorly educated ones, and by 
making jobs less secure than heretofore, this phenomenon is likely to create greater 
social reliance unemployment insurance, public support for education and training, 
and a wide variety of welfare state services. In this process, the existing policy 
systems run a much increased risk of generating the quicksand effect.  
5. Illustrative Reform Proposals 
  To meet the challenges above, many OECD countries require a fundamental 
reform of their current policy systems, so as to avoid the pitfall of relying on measures 
that give way as soon as there is a significant demand for them. As noted, a promising 
way to do so is to design networks of policies that not only give automatic support to A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM      12 
people facing adverse economic and social contingencies, but also automatically 
provide greater economic incentives to overcome these contingencies. The following 
set of complementary policy approaches are a good illustration of how this could be 
achieved. 
5a. The Opt-Out Program 
The idea this proposal
9 is simple. Classify everyone in the economy by income, 
age, sex, marital status, and other major determinants of people's demand for welfare 
state services, and compute the per capita cost of these services within each group. 
The proposal is then to give people the option of relinquishing their entitlements to 
these services in specific areas in return for a rebate amounting to x% of the cost of 
these services within their particular group. (In practice, the rebate could amount to 
about 70%.)  
If the entitlements accrue at present (as in the case of public education for 
people with children of school age), the rebate would take the form of a tax reduction. 
On the other hand, if the entitlements are to accrue in the future (as in the case of 
pensions for those of working age), the rebate would take the form of a bond, with a 
maturity commensurate with the time when the entitlements accrue. This option is to 
be supplemented by compulsory insurance against sickness, disability, and old age.  
That would leave (1-x) % of the funds to cover the deadweight loss arising when 
people who consume a disproportionately small fraction of each type of service take 
disproportionately large advantage of the opt-out option. By specifying the personal 
characteristics of each opt-out group sufficiently narrowly, governments could reduce 
the deadweight loss below x% of the available funds, leaving a surplus to improve the 
state-provided services. 
The motivation is to put the decision between public and private welfare 
provision into the hands of the consumer. The failure of central planning to bring 
living standards in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union into line with those in 
advanced market economies indicates how important it is to get this decision right. 
The strength of the advanced market economies has been to put the decision into the 
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hands of the consumer. The Opt-Out Program puts the division of responsibility over 
welfare state services into the consumer's hands as well.  
It is often argued that allowing people to leave the welfare state system would 
turn it into a poverty program, and that services for the poor eventually turn into poor 
services. This argument, however, does not apply to the Opt-Out Program. First, there 
would be no special incentive for the rich to opt out while the poor stay in. Those 
affluent people who consume little of these services would thus get a small rebate and 
have a correspondingly small incentive to opt out. Those making greater claims on 
these services (such as the middle classes on pensions and education, or the poor on 
housing and non-contributory benefits) would receive a larger rebate and have a 
correspondingly larger incentive to opt out. Second, under the Opt-Out Program, the 
size of the rebate for those who have opted out is tied to the cost of the state-provided 
services for those who have remained in. Thus those who opt out would have no 
incentive to vote for a run-down of the state sector. 
The Opt-Out Program is equivalent to giving everyone a voucher for specific 
welfare state services, with the size of the voucher depending on personal 
characteristics, and with somewhat larger vouchers going to those who do not opt out 
of the state system. The Program thereby gives people appropriate incentives for 
choosing between public and private provision of welfare state services. People who 
opt out will be the ones whose particular needs can be met more adequately through 
private providers. Given the enormous diversity of needs and the inevitable 
standardization of publicly provided services, it is inevitable that such people should 
exist. Consequently, the public and private welfare state systems would exist side by 
side, each providing services in which they have a comparative advantage. The 
resulting competition would give both an incentive to become more efficient than they 
would otherwise be.  
In short, the Opt-Out Program is a straightforward way for governments to 
reduce their spending on the "welfare society" without putting significant segments of 
the voting population at a disadvantage. The reduction in distortionary tax-and-
transfer arrangements should gradually generate enough saving to the government - 
through taxation of the new private sector welfare provision - to permit improved state 
provision. A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM      14 
  Observe how this program operates as a dual stabilizer and thereby avoids the 
quicksand effect. It provides not only support against economic and social 
uncertainties, but also automatically raises the incentives to overcome these 
uncertainties when the need of support rises. Under the policy regime established by 
this program, a government that reduces its welfare state services in the face of 
budgetary pressures would thereby induce more people to opt-out of public sector 
provision. Since these people would all receive rebates for relinquishing their 
entitlements to public support, this policy strategy would not ease the government’s 
budgetary problems. In this way, the government would be forced to internalize some 
important social costs and benefits of its welfare state involvement. 
5b. Government Loan Guarantees 
This proposal involves a simple, inexpensive way in which the government 
could help the private sector to provide some important welfare state services more 
efficiently.  
Many of the problems that the welfare state attempts to address have their 
origins in imperfect capital markets. The problem of unemployment is an example. 
The hardship from unemployment is due not only to the reduction in people's lifetime 
income but also to their inability to borrow against their incomes in future periods of 
employment. The most appropriate way of dealing with this problem is not through 
government provision of unemployment benefits, but through government loan 
guarantees.
10  
The reason why the free market generally does not give people the opportunity 
to borrow against their human capital is that banks usually have trouble collecting the 
debts from people who change jobs and geographical regions, and thus lending on the 
basis of human capital would encourage default. The government, however, has a 
comparative advantage in this area. Unlike banks, it is able to trace people through the 
tax system and is thus in an advantageous position to make loan guarantees. Once 
loans on human capital have thereby been made possible, people's unemployment 
durations would become more efficient since they would now come closer to paying 
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for the cost of their unemployment as well as receiving the benefits from a judicious 
job match.  
Roughly the same approach is also appropriate to education. The main reason 
why the free market provides less than the efficient amount of education is that 
students are generally unable to borrow against their future incomes. Government loan 
guarantees would help students, particularly poor students, in acquiring a more 
efficient amount of education, since they would come closer to internalizing both the 
costs and the benefits from their education.  
Loan guarantees for health insurance would also promote efficiency in this 
market and help bring poor people's opportunities for health cover a step closer to 
those of the more affluent.  
  This policy clearly has a dual stabilizer function that helps circumvent the 
quicksand effect. The loan guarantees would be maximally effective in providing 
support against unemployment, education, and health care when the public’s need for 
these services was greatest. Since the loan guarantees would stimulate private sector 
activity, the government’s tax revenue from this activity may generally be expected to 
outweigh its costs of loan default, thereby making the government’s budget less, 
rather than more, sensitive to external shocks. 
5c. Support Accounts 
This proposal is to replace current public support systems by support accounts 
(SAs). The budgets of the current public support systems - such as unemployment 
benefit systems, public pension plans, and nationalized health care, and publicly 
provided education - are often financed out of general taxes. Under the proposal, 
employed people would be required to make ongoing contributions to their SAs and 
the balances on these accounts would each individually be used to cover their pension 
requirements, their health and education needs, and their income support whenever 
periods of unemployment, illness, or disability lead to financial distress.
11 
The basic idea is to replace the current tax-and-transfer system -  whereby 
general tax revenues are used to finance unemployment benefits, pensions, public 
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health and education - by a system of compulsory private saving. When people 
become old, unemployed, ill, disabled, or have children of school age, their 
withdrawals from their SAs would be the substitute for the unemployment benefits, 
public pensions, etc. they currently receive. Thus their financial support would depend 
significantly on the accumulated balances in their SAs.  
To meet its equity objectives, the government would top up the contributions 
of individuals in the lowest income groups. In fact, when an individual’s SA has been 
exhausted (i.e. the SA balance falls to zero) and all the permissible transfers among 
SAs have been exploited, the person would becomes entitled to assistance from the 
government on precisely the same terms under the current public support systems. 
Correspondingly, a portion of each employed person’s SA contributions, month by 
month, would be spent on an “assistance charge” to help finance the assistance above. 
When people’s SA balances are sufficiently high, they could use the surplus 
funds for any other purposes; and at the end of their working lives, their remaining SA 
balances in their unemployment accounts could be transferred into their pension 
schemes. Balances remaining at the end of one’s life could be bequeathed to one’s 
successors. 
The aim of the proposal is to reduce the major efficiency losses created by the 
current public support systems without sacrificing their underlying redistributive 
goals. For example, unlike unemployment benefits, the unemployment SAs would do 
less to discourage job search, for when an unemployed person finds a job and 
contributes to his unemployment SA, he is reducing the financial uncertainty 
associated with future periods of unemployment and creating wealth that he will be 
able to use later on. Moreover, the pension SAs would do less to discourage saving 
then public pension plans, since pension SA balances can be bequeathed whereas the 
public pension plans cannot. 
People would be given some discretion over who could manage their SA 
funds: the government or financial institutions in the private sector. To minimize the 
danger of bankruptcy, the financial activities of the private-sector SA fund managers 
would have to be regulated, along lines similar to the regulation of commercial banks.  
  The process of transition from the current public support systems to ones 
based on SAs would of course have to be gradual. It takes time for people to 
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transition process would be to put new entrants to the labor force under the SA 
system. The Opt-Out Program would enable people to speed this transition process up, 
perhaps substantially. 
It is easy to see that the SAs would act as automatic stabilizers in both senses 
above, not only securing people against uncertainties and stabilizing their incomes, 
but also creating greater incentives to overcome the underlying problem. Consider the 
effect of unemployment SAs, for example. These would not only provide support 
when people are unemployed, but also generate greater incentives for employment 
creation and job search as unemployment rises. The greater is the expected duration of 
unemployment, the greater would be the incentive for people to avoid periods of 
unemployment. For the longer a person is unemployed, the lower would be his 
unemployment SA balance and thus the smaller the funds available to him at a later 
date. In this way, the unemployed person would internalize many of the social costs 
generated by his unemployment. And this efficiency gain could be achieved without 
sacrificing their underlying redistributive goals. Besides, the unemployment SAs are 
more efficient than unemployment benefits at redistributing income from rich to poor, 
since unemployment benefits are not targeted at the poor, whereas government 
unemployment assistance under the USA system is. 
Moving from the current public support systems to the SA system could have a 
profound effect on economic activities. People would have greater incentives to avoid 
the risks of unemployment, illness and disability. The reason is that under the current 
public support systems, people receive few financial penalties. For example, people 
pay no costs for remaining unemployed other than those associated with current 
income foregone and a possible reduction in prospects of future employment. When 
an unemployed person finds a job, his unemployment benefits and various welfare 
state entitlements are withdrawn and taxes are imposed, and this discourages him from 
job search. The disincentive effect is particularly large for people considering the 
movement from unemployment into part-time or temporary employment. Under the 
SA system, by contrast, this disincentive effect would be far less pronounced. The 
longer a person remains unemployed, the lower will be his SA balance and 
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unemployed person is largely internalizing the social costs generated by his 
unemployment.
12 The same principle holds for the health care accounts.  
On this account, the SA contributions necessary to finance a particular level of 
unemployment, health, and disability support (in the form of SA disbursements) will 
be lower than the taxes necessary to finance the same level of support under the 
current system of public provision financed through general taxation. In this way, the 
public stands to gain from a switch from the current public support systems to the SA 
system.  
5d. Conditional Negative Income Taxes 
  The previous proposals were predominantly concerned with promoting 
prosperity by making the provision of state services more efficient. We now turn to 
proposals that are primarily aimed at promoting social cohesion through the 
redistribution of income. On the whole, most OECD countries conduct such 
redistribution in exceedingly inefficient ways, needlessly reducing incentives for 
employment and production and imposing unnecessary burdens on governments’ 
budgets, thereby enhancing the quicksand effect. 
 This section considers a promising, largely untried, policy alternative: the 
conditional negative income tax. To put the advantages of this policy into sharp 
perspective and to illustrate what the negative income tax should be “conditional” on, 
it is useful to view it as replacing a current redistributive policy, such as the current 
unemployment benefit system. In this context, the conditions attached to the proposed 
negative income tax would be analogous to those attached to current unemployment 
benefits. For instance if, under the current unemployment benefit system, people must 
provide evidence of serious job search in order to qualify for unemployment benefits, 
then they must also be required to provide such evidence under the proposed 
conditional negative income tax system; If unemployment benefits decline with 
unemployment duration under the current benefit system, then so too must the 
negative income taxes.   
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The broad argument in favour of this switch from unemployment benefits to 
negative income taxes is that this policy could meet the equity and efficiency 
objectives of current unemployment benefit systems more effectively than the 
unemployment benefit systems themselves. Although conditional negative income 
taxes would generate the same type of policy inefficiencies as unemployment benefits, 
the former would tend to do so to a lesser degree than the latter. For example, negative 
income taxes may be expected to discourage job search, but by less than 
unemployment benefits, for when a worker finds a job, he loses all his unemployment 
benefits, but only a fraction of his negative income taxes.  
It is worth noting that a major criticism of the traditional negative income tax 
schemes - namely, that they make people's material well-being less dependent on 
employment and thereby discourage employment - obviously doesn't apply to 
conditional negative income taxes, since these taxes are conditional on the same 
things as current unemployment benefits.  
Furthermore, conditional negative income taxes also tend to be more effective 
than unemployment benefits in overcoming labour market inefficiencies generated by 
credit constraints (e.g. people being unable to take enough time to find an appropriate 
job match or unable to acquire the appropriate amount of training on account of credit 
constraints), since the presence of these constraints is more closely associated with 
low incomes than with unemployment.  
Against this, conditional negative income taxes are by their nature less effective 
than the economic theorists' socially optimal unemployment insurance schemes in 
overcoming efficiency problems in the unemployment insurance market (such as the 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection). The reason, of course, is that 
conditional negative income taxes are designed to reduce people's risk of poverty, 
rather than risk of unemployment. However, the practical significance of comparing 
conditional negative income taxes with socially optimal unemployment insurance 
schemes is generally small, since the unemployment benefit systems operative in most 
OECD countries do not to have much in common with the central features of optimal 
unemployment insurance. One reason is that most of the existing unemployment 
insurance schemes either impose ceilings on benefits are a these benefits as flat rates, 
while optimal unemployment insurance does not have is property. In many European 
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span of employment, which optimal unemployment insurance would clearly do. 
Moreover, the relative contributions of employers, employees, and the government to 
the current unemployment insurance schemes bear little if any relation to the social 
costs that these agents fail to internalise.   
Given that unemployment benefit systems in practice have little in common with 
the main features of optimal unemployment insurance, the efficiency case for the 
unemployment benefit systems is considerably weakened. What remains, then, is the 
equity case; but here - as we have noted - unemployment benefits tends to be less 
effective than conditional negative income taxes.   
  Finally, the unemployment benefit system has the well-known advantage that 
since it is more narrowly targeted than a conditional negative income tax system 
which provides a similar level of support for the target group, the unemployment 
benefit system tends to be less expensive. Specifically, the unemployment benefit 
system requires a lower level of tax revenue to finance a given level of support for its 
target group than does the conditional negative income tax system. This disadvantage 
of conditional negative income taxes versus unemployment benefits must be set is the 
advantages noted above. Should the disadvantage prove to be overwhelming in 
particular instances, policy makers may wish to target the conditional negative income 
taxes in the same way as the unemployment benefits are currently targeted. 
5d. The Benefit Transfer Program 
As rising unemployment represents one of the severest challenges to the 
achievement of prosperity and social cohesion in many OECD countries for the 21st 
century, it is of paramount importance to consider how policy inefficiencies and 
inequities in this area can be undone. The aim of the Benefit Transfer Program
13 
(BTP) is simply to redirect the funds that the government currently spends on the 
unemployed - in the form of unemployment benefits, temporary layoff pay, 
redundancy subsidies, poverty allowances, and more - so as to give firms an incentive 
to employ these people. 
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The BTP gives the long-term unemployed people the opportunity to use some 
of the money that pays for their unemployment support to provide vouchers to firms 
that hire them. The longer people are unemployed, the greater the vouchers that 
employers would receive for hiring them. Employers would also be given greater 
vouchers if they could prove that they were using them entirely to train their new 
recruits. 
 If the support for the unemployed comes in the form of unemployment 
benefits, the BTP would enable the long-term unemployed to transfer a portion of 
their unemployment benefits into employment vouchers. If, on the other hand, the 
support was in the form of unemployment SA balances, the BTP would permit the 
long-term unemployed to offer a fraction of these balances as an inducement to 
potential employers. 
 Since the BTP is voluntary, it extends the range of choices open to the 
unemployed and their potential employers. The unemployed will join only if it is to 
their advantage. Many could become much better off, since the wages they would be 
offered could will be significantly higher than their unemployment benefits. At the 
same time, employers will join only if they find it profitable. Once again, many could 
well do so, since the vouchers could significantly reduce their labor costs. In short, 
employees may wind up receiving substantially more than their unemployment 
support, and many employers may find themselves paying substantially less than the 
prevailing wages. The difference is the unemployment support that has been 
transferred to employment vouchers. 
 The BTP would be an automatic stabilizer in both senses above: As 
unemployment rises, the aggregate amount of funds available for unemployment 
support would rise (because more people are drawing on their unemployment benefits 
or their USA balances) and thus more funds would automatically be available for 
employment vouchers. Thus, in the process of stabilizing incomes, the program would 
simultaneously provide incentives for employment creation and job search when they 
are needed most. 
  Beyond that, the BTP would clearly not be inflationary, since it would reduce 
firms' labor costs and since the long-term unemployed have no noticeable effect on 
wage inflation. It would cost the government nothing, since the money for the 
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offering higher vouchers for training, the Program could become the basis for an 
effective national training initiative. Clearly, firms will spend the vouchers on training 
only if they intend to retain their recruits after the subsidies have run out. Thus the 
training for the unemployed would automatically come with the prospect of long-term 
employment. This is something that the existing government training schemes do not 
offer. Many existing schemes also run the risk of being ill-suited to people's diverse 
potential job opportunities, whereas under the BTP firms would naturally provide the 
training most appropriate to the available jobs. And whereas the existing training 
schemes are costly to run, the BTP is free.  
  Finally, the BTP could play a vital role in tackling regional unemployment 
problems. Regions of high unemployment would become areas containing a high 
proportion of workers with training vouchers, thereby providing an incentive for 
companies to move there and provide the appropriate training.  
  The fall in unemployment would also give some governments the opportunity 
to expand their tax base by raising the retirement age for both men and women to 70. 
The cost of social provision to the tax payer has exploded not just because these 
services have been getting steadily more expensive, but also because many 
governments artificially depress the number of tax payers through its retirement 
legislation. Not only do people live longer than they used to, but they also continue to 
be productive for longer. By putting many elderly people out of work long before they 
cease being productive, governments increase the number of dependents on the 
welfare sate and reduce the number providing financial support. Raising the retirement 
age would keep advanced industrialized countries from hamstringing themselves in 
this curious way. 
6. Concluding Thoughts 
  The reform proposals above are all part of a single, coherent overall strategy 
that is meant to promote prosperity and social cohesion by reversing the long-run 
instability inherent in many of the dominant policy systems in OECD countries. I have 
argued that such reform is particularly important nowadays, since the OECD faces 
some rapidly growing challenges to social cohesion in the years ahead: globalization, 
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productivity growth in the welfare state sector. What these developments have in 
common is that, as we have seen, they all tend to yield greater dispersion of wages and 
of employment opportunities within the advanced market economies of the OECD, so 
that a given amount of economic prosperity can be achieved only through social 
polarization and loss of social cohesion. Thereby these developments imply a 
progressively growing need for a social safety net and for insurance against economic 
uncertainties - a growing need, in other words, for welfare state services. But as 
productivity growth in the welfare state sector continues to trail behind average 
productivity, the cost of welfare state services will continue to rise, and the growing 
need for these services will become ever more difficult to satisfy. If the prevailing 
policy systems are progressively dismantled, then these systems will, over the long 
run, amplify unfavorable economic and social shocks and thereby impart an imbalance 
to their host countries. 
  Furthermore, I have suggested that, to avoid this “quicksand effect”, the 
OECD requires a new generation of policy systems that have a “dual stabilizer” role: 
when adverse economic or social contingencies arise, these systems must 
automatically provide both support for those affected and greater economic incentives 
to overcome these contingencies. The four reform proposals above - the Opt-Out 
program, the government loan guarantees, the Support Accounts, and the Benefit 
Transfer Program, - are illustrative of this fundamental reform strategy. They all serve 
to give individuals greater responsibility and greater choice in the provision of public 
goods. In addition, they all provide people with greater incentives to avoid wasting 
resources in the production and distribution of these goods.  
  They rest on the realization that some of the major market failures in OECD 
countries are the outcome of existing public policies, since these policies often distort 
individuals’ incentives to achieve their economic goals efficiently. And the reform 
proposals aim to readjust these incentives by helping individuals internalize the main 
costs and benefits of their activities. Although the need for social cohesion makes a 
total internalization of these costs and benefits socially undesirable, it is clear that 
many of the prevailing redistributive policies are needlessly inefficient. The reform 
proposals above point to a strategy for achieving our redistributive goals at minimal 
efficiency cost. They may thereby provide a vital opportunity of achieving prosperity 
together with social cohesion in the 21st century.  A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM      24 
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